STATE OF ILLINOIS ) ) SS: COUNTY OF C O O K ) IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION CITY OF CHICAGO, an Illinois ) municipal corporation, ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 2021 CH 01987 vs. WESTFORTH SPORTS, INC., ) Defendant. )

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS taken in the above-entitled cause before the Honorable Clare J. Quish, Judge of said Court, and reported stenographically by Patricia M. Stone, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Illinois, at Room 2301, 50 West Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois, on the 28th day of September, 2023, at 10:30 o'clock a.m.

REPORTED BY: PATRICIA M. STONE, CSR LICENSE NO: 084-002880 JOB NO: 6433076-001

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1	APPEARANCES: Page 2	1	Page 3
2		2	
3	EVERYTOWN LAW	3	BRAUM RUDD
4	BY: MS. ALLA LEFKOWITZ	4	BY: MR. TIMOTHY R. RUDD
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9	(646) 324-8220	9	On behalf of Defendant.
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12	On behalf of Plaintiff;	12	
13		13	
14	CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF LAW	14	
15	BY: MS. CHELSEY METCALF, Assistant Corporation	15	
16	Counsel	16	
17	121 North LaSalle Street, Suite 600	17	
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19	(312) 744-9484	19	
20	chelsey.metcalf@cityofchicago.org	20	
21	On behalf of Plaintiff;	21	
22		22	
23		23	
24		24	
1	Page 4 THE COURT: All right. This is the case of	1	Page 5 argument on plaintiff's motion to modify the
2	City of Chicago versus Westforth Sports, 21 CH 1987.	2	May 25th, 2023 order and for leave to file an amended
3	If the parties want to approach. Good	3	complaint.
4	morning.	4	So I have reviewed the motion, the
5	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Good morning.	5	response, and the reply, and the attachments.
6	Alla Lefkowitz for the City of Chicago; and with me,	6	Obviously I am familiar with the case and with the
7	I have James Miller and Chelsey Metcalf.	7	May 25th order.
8	THE COURT: Good morning.	8	Ms. Lefkowitz, do you have any argument
9	MS. METCALF: Good morning.	9	you wish to make on your motion?
10	THE COURT: Can you tell me those names one	10	MS. LEFKOWITZ: I would, yes, your Honor.
11	more time.	11	And as your Honor just indicated, we are dealing
12	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Sure, Alla Lefkowitz.	12	here with two separate motions; the motion to
13	THE COURT: Let me see. Maybe I have them	13	modify the dismissal order as well as the motion
14	in the brief.	14	to amend. I will start with the motion to modify
15	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Yeah.	15	first.
16	THE COURT: I'm so used to Zoom where	16	I think there's two facts that are not
17	everyone's names are nicely written out that you get	17	in dispute here which is that the Court's May 25th
18	sort of spoiled by that.	18	dismissal order was with prejudice even though it
19	Okay. And then your name again?	19	pertained to a motion, a jurisdictional motion, and
20	MS. METCALF: Chelsey Metcalf.	20	notably Westforth neither in its papers nor in oral
21	THE COURT: All right.	21	argument ever asked for dismissal with prejudice and
22	MR. RUDD: Tim Rudd for Westforth Sports.	22	that is because the law in Illinois and throughout
23	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.	23	the country on this is clear that once the Court
24	All right. So we're here today for	24	determines that it has no jurisdiction to hear the
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1	Page 6 matter it cannot dismiss the case with prejudice.	1	Page 7 dismissal but sent it back to the trial court to
1		1	indicate whether the dismissal should be with
2	THE COURT: Well, what case says it cannot	3	prejudice or not with prejudice.
	dismiss the case with prejudice? Because there are many cases cited by Mr. Rudd in his response brief	4	
4	where the Court does dismiss it with prejudice for	5	The trial court affirmed that it was
5	lack of personal jurisdiction.	6	with prejudice, and then that very question went up to went back up to the First District, and the
7		7	Court held that because that the decision had to
8	MS. LEFKOWITZ: So those cases I think there were two or three cases that he indicated where	8	
		9	be without prejudice because it was a jurisdictional
9	it is absolutely right that it was a jurisdictional	10	motion, and the Court had not gotten to the merits of the issue.
10	motion that was dismissed with prejudice. But in those cases, the sorry, the plaintiffs never took	11	And I think the Seventh Circuit actually
12		12	•
13	issue with the prejudice designation.	13	says it best. I think the case is Murray v. Conseco
	So that particular question was never		where it says no jurisdiction and with prejudice are mutually exclusive, and that's something that can
14	put forward or discussed by the appellate courts whereas the cases that we have cited specifically	14 15	be found in the statement, in a number of other
16	address that very issue. And, you know, one of	15	appellate cases as well, and I can go through
17	the cases, for example, that we mention is the	17	them.
18	Norris v. Estate of Norris case from the	18	You know, I think what Westforth's main
19	First District, and that's a case where I think it's	19	argument that they are really relying on here is
20	helpful to walk through the procedural posture of	20	that the Court's order wasn't intended to be with
20	that case.	20	prejudice as to the entire case but just with the
22	It was dismissed on subject matter	22	issue of jurisdiction, but respectfully that's not
23	jurisdiction by the trial court. It went up to the	23	that's not what the decision says. It just says it
24	First District. The First District affirmed that	24	was with prejudice.
	Page 8		Page 9
1	And even if that was the case, you know,	1	MS. LEFKOWITZ: The Lake Point case, yes,
2	And even if that was the case, you know, what we have argued in this motion is that dismissing	2	MS. LEFKOWITZ: The Lake Point case, yes, with regard to the second error. But with regard to
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1	should never have been dismissed with prejudice, it	1	deficiency
2	was 2616(a) that applied.	2	THE COURT: How is that an error? I
3	THE COURT: It was dismissed on the merits	3	understand your argument on the first error when you
4	on a statute of limitations issue.	4	said that I should have made it without prejudice,
5	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Exactly, exactly.	5	and that's the error that you're raising.
6	And then, you know, just to point to	6	But with respect to this motion for
7	another case that I think is helpful here on this	7	leave to amend, you never sought leave to amend in
8	issue which I think is the case of Cohen v. Salata.	8	response to your motion to dismiss or at any time
9	There I think we have a subject matter case, and the	9	before I ruled on the motion to dismiss. Is that
10	Court says, "Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the	10	right?
11	Court's only function is to announce the fact that	11	MS. LEFKOWITZ: That is absolutely right.
12	it lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the case the	12	THE COURT: Okay. So how is that an error
13	cause."	13	that I made in the dismissal with prejudice?
14	In there, the Court vacated the order	14	MS. LEFKOWITZ: The error the error there
15	dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice	15	is because we had presented the Court with evidence
16	and remanded the case with directions that it dismiss	16	that we could amend based on the very fact on
17	the plaintiff's complaint against the defendants for	17	the very issue that was the heart of the motion to
18	want of jurisdiction.	18	dismiss which was sales directly to Illinois by
19	The Court said such dismissal, by its	19	Westforth that contributed to the public nuisance,
20	very nature, is not an adjudication on the merits and	20	and the Court, you know, stated that it couldn't
21	is, therefore, without prejudice.	21	consider those because it wasn't part of the
22	So, you know, here just getting to the	22	complaint, but we had indicated
23	second error on the motion to modify which is the,	23	THE COURT: And you agreed or your
24	you know, the fact that we are able to cure this	24	co-counsel agreed with that analysis.
	Page 12		Page 13
		1	5
1	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Yes, yes, absolutely.	1	is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
2	THE COURT: Okay.	2	is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to a relief," and here it was
2 3	THE COURT: Okay. MS. LEFKOWITZ: And for that reason, we	2 3	is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to a relief," and here it was clear that we could it wasn't clear sorry, I'm
2 3 4	THE COURT: Okay. MS. LEFKOWITZ: And for that reason, we sought, you know, as soon as the Court entered the	2 3 4	is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to a relief," and here it was clear that we could it wasn't clear sorry, I'm getting the we had put forward facts that we could
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2 3 4 5 6	THE COURT: Okay. MS. LEFKOWITZ: And for that reason, we sought, you know, as soon as the Court entered the dismissal order, we sought leave to replead on this issue, but we had indicated to the Court that we	2 3 4 5 6	is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to a relief," and here it was clear that we could it wasn't clear sorry, I'm getting the we had put forward facts that we could cure the deficiency. So that is the error that we are alleging that it should not have been dismissed
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1		1	
	Page 14		Page 15
	How is lack of personal jurisdiction a	1	under Rule 23.
2	procedural technicality?	2	MS. LEFKOWITZ: I understand.
3	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Well, I think once a Court	3	THE COURT: Okay.
4	does not have jurisdiction, you know, determines	4	MS. LEFKOWITZ: I'm just going through it.
5	that it has no power to hear the case, anything	5	I actually do think no, that's also a merits case,
6	that, you know, a judgment that comes after it	6	but I do think in either case the standard that
7	becomes void because, you know, a final judgment	7	applies here is the 2-616(a) standard, not the
8	according to the Illinois Supreme Court has to be on	8	2-616(c) standard that Westforth proposes.
9	the merits.	9	Under that standard, there are four
10	So I think, you know, here the	10	questions that are asked; whether the whether the
11	procedural deficiencies that I would identify is that	11	amendment would cure the deficiency, whether the
12	we put forward the facts, but we didn't put them into	12	amendment is a surprise, whether the amendment is
13	our complaint that would be necessary to have the	13	timely, and whether there had been previous
14	personal jurisdiction, you know, that is required for	14	opportunities to amend, and I think on the first
15	the Court to hear this case.	15	when you look at those two factors or those four
16	THE COURT: Do you have any case that	16	factors, I believe that the city meets those
17	allowed leave to amend the complaint after the trial	17	factors.
18	court had dismissed the case for lack of personal	18	On the first two that we can cure the
19	jurisdiction?	19	deficiency, Westforth has made no argument that we
20	MS. LEFKOWITZ: So I do have a case. It's	20	can't because, of course, what we're talking about
21	an unpublished case. So we didn't cite it.	21	here is exactly sales into the state that caused harm
22	THE COURT: Right. From when?	22	in Chicago.
23	MS. LEFKOWITZ: From 2011.	23	Then there's no, of course, dispute that
24	THE COURT: Okay. So I can't rely on that	24	this wouldn't cause any undue surprise to Westforth.
	Deves 10		D 17
1	Page 16 We are nowhere near trial. This is really, you know,	1	Page 17 had sought that discovery, but we had not received
			Ind bought chat arbcovery, but we had not received
2	at the beginning of the case. Of course, these	2	any discovery with respect to the Illinois
2	at the beginning of the case. Of course, these records come from Westforth itself. So it hasn't		
	5 5	2	any discovery with respect to the Illinois
3	records come from Westforth itself. So it hasn't	2 3	any discovery with respect to the Illinois transactions.
3 4	records come from Westforth itself. So it hasn't argued any kind of unfair surprise.	2 3 4	any discovery with respect to the Illinois transactions. So all of the Illinois transactions
3 4 5	records come from Westforth itself. So it hasn't argued any kind of unfair surprise. I think where Westforth is really	2 3 4 5	any discovery with respect to the Illinois transactions. So all of the Illinois transactions started only coming in as of May, 2022, and it
3 4 5 6	records come from Westforth itself. So it hasn't argued any kind of unfair surprise. I think where Westforth is really hanging its hat is the timeliness of the amendment.	2 3 4 5 6	any discovery with respect to the Illinois transactions. So all of the Illinois transactions started only coming in as of May, 2022, and it ended up being a rolling production that wasn't
3 4 5 6 7	records come from Westforth itself. So it hasn't argued any kind of unfair surprise. I think where Westforth is really hanging its hat is the timeliness of the amendment. But here, of course, there's no dispute that we	2 3 4 5 6 7	any discovery with respect to the Illinois transactions. So all of the Illinois transactions started only coming in as of May, 2022, and it ended up being a rolling production that wasn't finished until September which is when our brief was
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1	Page 18 Court you know, the courts that evaluate this	1	Page 19 especially, you know, given how early we are in the
2	look at how many times before the complaint has been	2	case, given that this is our first attempt to amend,
3	amended.	3	given that we can put forth facts that would, you
4	THE COURT: But those courts look at it in	4	know, that would cure the deficiency, I think that
5	terms of how many times it has been amended to try to	5	it's appropriate for the Court to allow the amendment
6	state a claim, right, on the merits. That's what the	6	if for no other reason than if we were to ultimately
7	cases are about.	7	lose on a second motion to dismiss then at least the
8	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Yes. That's right.	8	Appellate Court would have the entire set of facts
9	THE COURT: Were there any cases that give	9	before it.
10	a party multiple a plaintiff multiple chances to	10	THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you want to
11	amend the complaint where there's a lack of	11	add?
12	jurisdiction that's been alleged or decided?	12	MS. LEFKOWITZ: No. That's it.
13	I didn't see any in the cases that you	13	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rudd.
14	cite but	14	MR. RUDD: Thank you, your Honor.
15	MS. LEFKOWITZ: I'm not 100 percent sure.	15	A couple of things. Going first to the
16	That may not be the case.	16	motion for leave to modify. Our position is that it
17	THE COURT: Okay. Sorry. Go ahead with	17	was not error for the Court to dismiss for lack of
18	your argument.	18	personal jurisdiction with prejudice.
19	MS. LEFKOWITZ: But I think, you know,	19	The Court's ruling, for all intents and
20	regardless of whether it's, you know, on personal	20	purposes, laid to rest that question which was the
21	jurisdiction grounds or on the merits, the factors	21	only question before the Court was whether there is
22	still end up being the same, you know, and those are	22	personal jurisdiction.
23	the four factors. I think we meet those factors; and	23	No one is operating under the belief
24	for those reasons, we would submit that we have	24	that it has that that ruling has a res judicata
1	Page 20 effect on this case. Westforth would stipulate and	1	Page 21 THE COURT: One that I know I won't be able
1 2		1 2	
	effect on this case. Westforth would stipulate and		THE COURT: One that I know I won't be able
2 3 4	effect on this case. Westforth would stipulate and had it been asked would happily stipulate to the fact that we will not raise res judicata should they seek to file those claims in Indiana where there is	2 3 4	THE COURT: One that I know I won't be able to pronounce correctly is Sheikholeslam. MR. RUDD: Your Honor, your guess is as good as mine.
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1	Page 22 store isn't open anymore. Westforth is in a position	1	Page 23 The motion for leave to amend is
	where it is going to argue and address the claims	2	squarely within the Court's discretion to decide
3	that are raised.	3	whether it's going to allow a post-judgment
4	The claims that were raised and the	4	amendment. The city could have sought leave to
5	City of Chicago did its homework. They presented	5	amend, and we would have addressed it. We would
6	to the Court a long complaint of two years ago that	6	argue that the proposed amendment was futile, but
7	identified specific sales and specific firearms	7	that's a different argument for a different day or at
8	recovered in Chicago. That's what we are here to	8	least a different time of day.
9	talk about, and all of those were in Indiana.	9	They said they were going to amend, and
10	The Court we would argue made that	10	they didn't. They waited until the Court ruled in
11	decision correctly. Here they haven't even begun to	11	favor of Westforth, and now they've attempted to
12	allege that any of these new guns they want to talk	12	complain about completely different transactions.
13	about now after the Court has already ruled have even	13	Specifically they've said that there are
14	entered Chicago let alone have been used in a crime.	14	some people who have Chicago addresses that bought
15	I've looked at their complaint. All it is is about	15	what the City of Chicago deems assault weapons. The
16	Indiana.	16	rule the ordinance cited by the plaintiff says
17	So I think the bigger issue	17	they are illegal to possess in Chicago. They are not
18	THE COURT: The new proposed amended	18	illegal to be owned by people who happen to have a
19	complaint?	19	residence in Chicago. They haven't argued that they
20	- MR. RUDD: Yes.	20	were possessed there. They haven't said that they
21	THE COURT: Okay.	21	were recovered in a crime there.
22	MR. RUDD: The modification there simply	22	THE COURT: Are these new claims that
23	was no error. I don't think there's anything to be	23	they're raising with respect to assault weapons?
24	added to that on that point.	24	MR. RUDD: Yeah. They do not relate at all
	Page 24		Page 25
1	to the alleged straw purchases with firearms	1	about and if you look at their amended complaint,
2	to the alleged straw purchases with firearms recovered in Chicago that were the basis of what	2	about and if you look at their amended complaint, your Honor, it is just a rehashing of Indiana
2 3	to the alleged straw purchases with firearms recovered in Chicago that were the basis of what we've been litigating for two years.	2 3	about and if you look at their amended complaint, your Honor, it is just a rehashing of Indiana transactions with a smattering of other things to try
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		1	
	Page 26		Page 27
1	post judgment.	1	transactions that this Court said it doesn't have
2	Here we are five months down the road	2	jurisdiction over.
3	from when this Court issued its ruling. The day	3	We enter into a jurisdictional or into a
4	that this Court issued its ruling the city could have	4	procedural morass that is unnecessary here. So our
5	gone to Indiana and brought the claims that it's	5	argument would be, especially where they haven't even
6	asking this Court to hear now. It could have. It	6	alleged damage relative to their supposed new
7	didn't.	7	transactions that they want to talk about that they
8	Before this Court issued its ruling,	8	haven't alleged recovery in Chicago, that they're
9	the city could have gone to Indiana and brought the	9	asking the Court to assume that which a pleading
10	different claims, the ones it's trying to add now.	10	can't do that, that it's futile, that it doesn't
11	It could have arguably done that in Illinois if it	11	change anything as to the Court's ruling as to the
12	wanted to. It didn't. And so there's no judicial	12	transactions that they initially complained about and
13	economy to be served here.	13	have left in their proposed amended complaint, and
14	What the city is attempting to do is	14	that given that there's futility, given that it's
15	they are attempting to take the original set of	15	obvious gamesmanship, given that it doesn't even
15	facts that they brought before this Court that	16	cure what they're seeking to cure because those
			1 5
17	they were upset about and somehow use them as	17	claims are not alleged in a way that they need to
18	momentum to attach something else and maybe stay in	18	be which is premature but it relates to the argument
19	Illinois.	19	at some point here, your Honor, I don't see how
20	Your Honor, I think it's easily seen for	20	justice is served by allowing the city to sit on an
21	what it is. If this Court were to grant the leave to	21	amendment just to get a second bite at the apple
22	amend, we immediately become in a situation where	22	especially when that amendment has nothing to do
23	we're arguing motions to strike literally 75 percent	23	with the transactions they have issued a complaint
24	of the complaint which is about nothing but the	24	about.
1	Page 28 THE COURT: If I were to apply the Loyola	1	Page 29 a couple claims about a couple transactions and
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2 3	THE COURT: If I were to apply the Loyola factors, are you arguing that there would be surprise or prejudice to Westforth by the motion for leave to	2	a couple claims about a couple transactions and somehow revive claims related to transactions that this Court already said don't arise out of or relate
2 3 4	THE COURT: If I were to apply the Loyola factors, are you arguing that there would be surprise or prejudice to Westforth by the motion for leave to amend or by the new amended proposed amended	2 3 4	a couple claims about a couple transactions and somehow revive claims related to transactions that this Court already said don't arise out of or relate to contacts with Illinois. Your Honor, we don't
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	Вереешьет	1	
1	Page 30	1	Page 31
1	MR. RUDD: I'd be happy to, your Honor.	1	haven't been used in crimes. I mean, that's just not
2	THE COURT: No but, I mean, that's one of	2	accurate.
3	the arguments that the plaintiff makes, and I didn't	3	I'm looking particularly at
4	see you making that in your brief, and I just wanted	4	Paragraph 103 of our proposed amended complaint
5	to clear that up as to whether you were.	5	where we specifically say from 2018 to 2021 the
6	MR. RUDD: No. Again we're not saying that	6	store sold at least 538 firearms to Illinois
7	the city couldn't pursue Illinois claims in Illinois	7	residents both in person and by making deliveries
8	and Indiana claims in Indiana. Should they decide	8	to Illinois FELs. Some of these guns have been
9	to do that, we will think about it and decide what	9	recovered in crimes in Chicago including homicide,
10	our response is. We don't waive anything, but I	10	assault, and robbery. Many others are still in
11	don't see any reason why they can't make whatever	11	circulation. And I do want to clarify this because I
12	strategic decision that they want to make, but I	12	think this has gotten lost in this argument.
13	don't think this is their decision. This is your	13	The public nuisance that we are
14	decision.	14	complaining of is the flooding of the City of Chicago
15	THE COURT: All right. Anything else,	15	with illegal guns from Westforth. Some of those guns
16	Mr. Rudd?	16	are straw purchases, and I don't want to relitigate
17	MR. RUDD: No, ma'am.	17	the motion to the jurisdictional motion again, but
18	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.	18	some of those guns come indirectly via purchasers in
19	Ms. Lefkowitz?	19	Illinois. Some of those illegal guns harm the City
20	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you. Just a few	20	of Chicago through direct sales into Indiana, and the
21	points.	21	harm here is twofold. It is both the harm of the
22	First, this assertion that the new	22	actual financial, you know, people getting shot, the
23	transactions and the new allegations that we're	23	city having to pay for ambulance services, et cetera,
24	making haven't resulted in any harm to the city and	24	but it is also in public nuisance the very real fear
	Dago 22		Dago 22
1	Page 32 that people have of engaging in public conduct,	1	Page 33 any doubt that is in favor of any doubt on the
1		1 2	
	that people have of engaging in public conduct,		any doubt that is in favor of any doubt on the
2	that people have of engaging in public conduct, engaging in public life, going on the streets, you	2	any doubt that is in favor of any doubt on the question of whether this will actually cure the
2 3	that people have of engaging in public conduct, engaging in public life, going on the streets, you know, using the Metra, all of that stuff, and I	2 3	any doubt that is in favor of any doubt on the question of whether this will actually cure the deficiency should go in favor of allowing the
2 3 4	that people have of engaging in public conduct, engaging in public life, going on the streets, you know, using the Metra, all of that stuff, and I think, you know, we cite a case in Paragraph 107	2 3 4	any doubt that is in favor of any doubt on the question of whether this will actually cure the deficiency should go in favor of allowing the amendment.
2 3 4 5	that people have of engaging in public conduct, engaging in public life, going on the streets, you know, using the Metra, all of that stuff, and I think, you know, we cite a case in Paragraph 107 of our proposed amended complaint where the	2 3 4 5	any doubt that is in favor of any doubt on the question of whether this will actually cure the deficiency should go in favor of allowing the amendment. THE COURT: Is that a jurisdiction case?
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	Depcember	1	
	Page 34		Page 35
1	Your concern is if it's with	1	that says, you know, litigating cases cannot be
2	prejudice it would mean on the merits and it has a	2	prejudiced. What the Courts are really talking about
3	res adjudicata effect. If it's without prejudice,	3	is when you're really close to trial and you're
4	what case says that means you automatically are	4	really putting the defendant at a disadvantage, and
5	you saying you automatically get leave to amend?	5	that's just not, you know, that's not the case here
6	MS. LEFKOWITZ: No, no. That's not what	6	at all. We're very far away from trial. There's no
7	we're saying.	7	actual prejudice to Westforth.
8	THE COURT: Okay. All right.	8	You know, I do take issue with
9	MS. LEFKOWITZ: What we're saying is that	9	Westforth's assertion that they are not saying that
10	then the 2-616(a) factors apply that would allow	10	we should litigate the case in two different forums.
11	and we would move to amend the complaint.	11	That's exactly what they're arguing. If it wants to
12	THE COURT: Did they do that in Cohen?	12	sue Westforth regarding sales of firearms in Indiana
13	MS. LEFKOWITZ: I don't I don't believe	13	to Indiana residents, it can attempt to do so in a
14	that that issue was discussed, but I do actually	14	court that actually has jurisdiction over those
15	think I might be wrong. I do think when a case is	15	claims.
16	dismissed without prejudice then there's nothing	16	Moreover, if it wants to sue Westforth
17	stopping a plaintiff from seeking from filing an	17	about something else in this court or somewhere else,
18	amended complaint. I'm not aware of any laws to the	18	it can attempt to do that as well. I mean, I think
19	contrary on that.	19	that's exactly what they're asking to do, and I don't
20	And then one other thing that I wanted	20	think that serves judicial efficiency. And at the
21	to mention, you know, is this idea of like no you	21	end of the day, the plaintiff is the master of their
22	know, of course, Westforth is not surprised but they	22	own complaint and, of course, it's up to the Court
23	claim to be prejudiced.	23	to determine whether there's jurisdiction or not,
24	Of course, we cite a case in our brief	24	but having us split up the case doesn't serve any
	Page 36		Page 37
1	Page 36 purpose.	1	Page 37 Procedure than I knew before this motion, but what
1 2	-	1 2	3
	purpose.		Procedure than I knew before this motion, but what
2	purpose. THE COURT: Okay. Were there any claims or	2	Procedure than I knew before this motion, but what the cases made clear is that with prejudice is
2 3	purpose. THE COURT: Okay. Were there any claims or allegations in the initial complaint related to these	2 3	Procedure than I knew before this motion, but what the cases made clear is that with prejudice is equivalent to on the merits. Those two things are
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	Page 38		Page 39
1	distinction between whether it's with or without	1	and that those firearms were recovered in Chicago.
2	prejudice.	2	It says we sold firearms and some of them were
3	MS. LEFKOWITZ: It talks about let me	3	recovered in Chicago, and that's a huge distinction.
4	pull that up.	4	THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Lefkowitz?
5	Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273	5	MS. LEFKOWITZ: I think, first of all, we do
6	provides that unless an order of dismissal or statute	6	in other parts of the proposed complaint say that
7	otherwise specified an involuntary dismissal, other	7	these sales were illegal. We repeatedly talk about
8	than a lack of dismissal for jurisdiction, operates	8	the melting point laws. Those guns were recovered in
9	as an adjudication on the merits and, I guess, the	9	crimes. We make that very clear in our complaint,
10	cases that I pointed to say that a motion that is	10	and I do think that that's not a jurisdictional
11	with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits, that	11	issue. That's a merits issue, you know, whether
12	those two things are the same.	12	ultimately those guns were illegally sold, but we are
13	THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you wish to	13	alleging that they were illegally sold and that they
14	say?	14	were recovered in crimes in Chicago.
15	MS. LEFKOWITZ: No, your Honor.	15	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. One more
16	THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Rudd?	16	thing.
17	MR. RUDD: Ten seconds.	17	To Mr. Rudd's point, he said if he had
18	THE COURT: Sure and then I'll let	18	been asked he would have stipulated that there would
19	Ms. Lefkowitz have the last word because it is her	19	be no res adjudicata effect from the order as it
20	motion.	20	currently stands, the May 25th order.
21	MR. RUDD: Sure.	21	Is that something the plaintiff is
22	I would just have the Court look real	22	interested in if it would resolve any of the issues
23	closely. They cited Paragraph 103 of their amended	23	in the motion?
24	complaint. It doesn't say that we made illegal sales	24	MS. LEFKOWITZ: It wouldn't because that
1	Page 40 doesn't deal with the second error in the motion	1	Page 41 pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in
1		1	5
	doesn't deal with the second error in the motion		pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in
2	doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with	2	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the
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2 3 4	doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.	2 3 4	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice.
2 3 4 5	doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. I am going to rule today but just give	2 3 4 5	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. Plaintiff argues that Illinois law is
2 3 4 5 6	doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out.	2 3 4 5 6	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. Plaintiff argues that Illinois law is clear that a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds does
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back.     MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. Plaintiff argues that Illinois law is clear that a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds does not adjudicate the merits of a plaintiff's claims and, therefore, must be dismissed must be without prejudice. After reviewing the cases cited by both parties, I agree that the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction does not operate as a disposition on the merits for res adjudicata purposes. Westforth appears to agree with the proposition although it obviously disagrees that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back. MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had         in the proceedings.)     THE COURT: All right. So, as I mentioned, I reviewed all of the parties' briefs and pleadings, and I appreciate both parties' oral arguments this morning.     For the following reasons, I'm going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. I'm going to grant the motion to modify to make the</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	<pre>pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice.</pre>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back. MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had         in the proceedings.)     THE COURT: All right. So, as I mentioned, I reviewed all of the parties' briefs and pleadings, and I appreciate both parties' oral arguments this morning.     For the following reasons, I'm going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. I'm going to grant the motion to modify to make the dismissal without prejudice, but I am denying leave</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. Plaintiff argues that Illinois law is clear that a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds does not adjudicate the merits of a plaintiff's claims and, therefore, must be dismissed must be without prejudice. After reviewing the cases cited by both parties, I agree that the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction does not operate as a disposition on the merits for res adjudicata purposes. Westforth appears to agree with the proposition although it obviously disagrees that the dismissal should be modified to be without prejudice.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back.     MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice.</pre>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back. MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had         in the proceedings.)     THE COURT: All right. So, as I mentioned, I reviewed all of the parties' briefs and pleadings, and I appreciate both parties' oral arguments this morning.         For the following reasons, I'm going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. I'm going to grant the motion to modify to make the dismissal without prejudice, but I am denying leave to amend.</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice.</pre>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back.     MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had         in the proceedings.)     THE COURT: All right. So, as I mentioned, I reviewed all of the parties' briefs and pleadings, and I appreciate both parties' oral arguments this morning.     For the following reasons, I'm going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. I'm going to grant the motion to modify to make the dismissal without prejudice, but I am denying leave to amend.     On May 25th, 2023, this Court granted Defendant Westforth's motion to dismiss and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for lack of </pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. Plaintiff argues that Illinois law is clear that a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds does not adjudicate the merits of a plaintiff's claims and, therefore, must be dismissed must be without prejudice. After reviewing the cases cited by both parties, I agree that the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction does not operate as a disposition on the merits for res adjudicata purposes. Westforth appears to agree with the proposition although it obviously disagrees that the dismissal should be modified to be without prejudice. The plaintiff cites several cases including People versus Smith (2017 Ill. App. 3d 150265), Cohen versus Salata (303 Ill. App. 3d 1060), a First District case from 1999, and Johnson versus
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>doesn't deal with the second error in the motion which is that a case shouldn't be dismissed with prejudice when the deficiency can be cured.     THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.     I am going to rule today but just give me about 10 or 15 minutes, and I'll come back out. So if you don't mind waiting, I'll be back. MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor.     (WHEREUPON, a brief pause was had         in the proceedings.)     THE COURT: All right. So, as I mentioned, I reviewed all of the parties' briefs and pleadings, and I appreciate both parties' oral arguments this morning.         For the following reasons, I'm going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. I'm going to grant the motion to modify to make the dismissal without prejudice, but I am denying leave to amend.</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>pursuant to Section 2-1203 that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and asks the Court to modify its order to provide the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice.</pre>

1	Page 42 hold that where there is no adjudication on the	1	Page 43 the merits.
2	merits the dismissal should be granted without	2	The Appellate Court refused to vacate
3	prejudice as opposed to with prejudice.	3	the dismissal order entirely however and held that
4	In People versus Smith, the Circuit	4	the defendant could refile his position, comply
5	Court found that there was no personal jurisdiction	5	with the service requirements, and have his petition
6	over the state, the defendant's Section 2-1401	6	heard.
7	petition, and then also reached the merits of the	7	In Cohen versus Salata, the Appellate
8	petition finding it to be barred by res adjudicata.	8	Court vacated the trial court's order dismissing
9	The Appellate Court found that the	9	the case with prejudice for lack of subject matter
10	trial court erred in going beyond the jurisdictional	10	jurisdiction and remanded the case to the
11	question in reaching the merits of	11	Circuit Court with directions that it dismiss the
12	the 1401 petition.	12	plaintiff's complaint against the defendants for want
13	The Court explained that, once the	13	of jurisdiction which the Court held, by its very
14	Circuit Court determined there was no personal	14	nature, was not adjudication on the merits and is,
15	jurisdiction over the state, the Court had no power	15	therefore, without prejudice.
16	to dismiss the petition on the merits. It explained	16	Westforth relies on Longo versus
17	that a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is not	17	AAA-Michigan and Sheikholeslam versus Favreau. In
18	res adjudicata on the merits of the petition.	18	both cases, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial
19	Accordingly the Appellate Court modified	19	court's dismissal of complaints for lack of personal
20	the Circuit Court's order to reflect that the 2-1401	20	jurisdiction with prejudice. However, as the
21	petition was dismissed without prejudice on the	21	plaintiff points out in our case, the Appellate Court
22	grounds that the failure to properly serve the state	22	in both of those two cases did not address whether
23	by certified mail deprived the Court of personal	23	the dismissal should have been with or without
24	jurisdiction. The Court also vacated the finding on	24	prejudice, and there's no indication in either of
1	Page 44 those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the	1	Page 45 Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed
1 2		1 2	
	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the		Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed
2	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice.	2	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three,
2	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case,	2 3	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four,
2 3 4	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court	2 3 4	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three,
2 3 4 5	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court	2 3 4 5	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the	2 3 4 5 6	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I find that those cases are not on point. So based on People versus Smith,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to amend would further the ends of justice. All of that was from the Loyola Academy case.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I find that those cases are not on point. So based on People versus Smith, Cohen versus Salata, and Johnson versus DuPage	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to amend would further the ends of justice. All of that was from the Loyola Academy case. With respect to the first factor,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I find that those cases are not on point. So based on People versus Smith, Cohen versus Salata, and Johnson versus DuPage Airport Authority, I will grant this portion of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to amend would further the ends of justice. All of that was from the Loyola Academy case. With respect to the first factor, curative effect, the city argues that its proposed
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I find that those cases are not on point. So based on People versus Smith, Cohen versus Salata, and Johnson versus DuPage Airport Authority, I will grant this portion of the plaintiff's motion and modify my May 25th, 2023 order to make the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice. The second part of plaintiff's motion seeks leave to amend its complaint to add new allegations which they claim addresses the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to amend would further the ends of justice. All of that was from the Loyola Academy case. With respect to the first factor, curative effect, the city argues that its proposed amended complaint cures the lack of personal jurisdiction deficiency in several ways. Plaintiff adds allegations that Westforth sold assault weapons and a number of illegal melting-point guns directly to residents of Chicago in violation of the city's municipal assault
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I find that those cases are not on point. So based on People versus Smith, Cohen versus Salata, and Johnson versus DuPage Airport Authority, I will grant this portion of the plaintiff's motion and modify my May 25th, 2023 order to make the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice. The second part of plaintiff's motion seeks leave to amend its complaint to add new allegations which they claim addresses the jurisdictional deficiencies.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to amend would further the ends of justice. All of that was from the Loyola Academy case. With respect to the first factor, curative effect, the city argues that its proposed amended complaint cures the lack of personal jurisdiction deficiency in several ways. Plaintiff adds allegations that Westforth sold assault weapons and a number of illegal melting-point guns directly to residents of Chicago in violation of the city's municipal assault weapons ban and the city's melting-point law.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	those decisions that the plaintiff objected to the dismissals being with prejudice. In Westforth's third cited case, Rios versus Bayer Corporation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action to the trial court for entering orders granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but did not indicate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. So I find that those cases are not on point. So based on People versus Smith, Cohen versus Salata, and Johnson versus DuPage Airport Authority, I will grant this portion of the plaintiff's motion and modify my May 25th, 2023 order to make the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice. The second part of plaintiff's motion seeks leave to amend its complaint to add new allegations which they claim addresses the jurisdictional deficiencies. Assuming that Section 16(a) applies	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Maintenance, Inc. case; one, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; two, whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; three, whether the proposed amendment is timely; and, four, whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. No single factor is dispositive, and the primary consideration is whether getting leave to amend would further the ends of justice. All of that was from the Loyola Academy case. With respect to the first factor, curative effect, the city argues that its proposed amended complaint cures the lack of personal jurisdiction deficiency in several ways. Plaintiff adds allegations that Westforth sold assault weapons and a number of illegal melting-point guns directly to residents of Chicago in violation of the city's municipal assault weapons ban and the city's melting-point law. However, in this proposed amended
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	Береешеет		
1	Page 46 related to the alleged public nuisance of the	1	Page 47 deficiency.
2	straw purchase of quis which is the basis of the	2	The proposed amended complaint also
3	plaintiff's complaint.	3	adds new relief in that it's seeking, as a remedy in
4	Additionally plaintiff adds more	4	this lawsuit, an order requiring Westforth to take
5	details about the convicted straw purchasers who	5	corrective action to identify and assist in
6	bought Westforth guns in Indiana which were later	6	recovering the firearms it sold and transferred in
7	recovered in Chicago, but none of these additional	7	violation of the melting-point law and the assault
8	facts allege so that the purchasers may contact with	8	weapons ban.
9	Illinois bilaterally.	9	All of these are new claims and new
10	There are no facts that the various	10	relief and new allegations not alleged in the
11	straw purchasers had a business relationship or	11	complaint and that don't cure any jurisdictional
12	contractual understanding which contemplated that	12	issue. So this first factor of curative effect
13	the straw purchases were acting for the benefit	13	favors the denial of leave to amend.
14	of both the straw purchasers and Westforth in	14	The second factor is prejudice or
14	Illinois.		
	Plaintiff's counsel admits that	15	surprise to the defendant. Westforth agrees that
16	plaintiff's original complaint, the only complaint,	16 17	there's no surprise here because the plaintiff had suggested or mentioned that it would plan to seek
17		18	55
18	does not include any claims related at all to the		leave to amend at some point. This factor weighs
19	sale of assault weapons. This proposed amended	19	in favor of granting the motion for leave to
20	complaint includes numerous references to and claims	20	amend. The next factor is timeliness. Here I
21	based upon the sale of assault weapons allegedly		
22	in violation of Chicago Municipal Codes. These are new claims and new allegations that are not	22	find the motion is not timely filed which weighs in
23	-	23 24	favor of denying leave to amend. As plaintiff
24	nearly attempting to correct a pleading	24	admits, it participated in substantial jurisdictional
	Page 48		Page 49
1	discovery both from Westforth and the ATF before it	1	pled in the original pleading or at least
2	responded to Westforth's motion to dismiss.	2	significantly sooner than leave was brought, this
3	Plaintiff learned of these new facts	3	factor favors the denial of leave to amend.
4	as early as May, 2022 or at the very latest by	4	Here the motion for leave to amend was
5	September. Yet plaintiff responded to the motion to	5	not filed promptly at the first opportunity.
6	dismiss on the merits of the motion.	6	Plaintiff admittedly had all of these additional
7	In their response brief, they simply	7	facts long before it sought leave to amend and didn't
8	ask the Court to deny the motion. It did not	8	do so.
9	plaintiff did not seek leave to amend in response to	9	Plaintiff had many prior opportunities
10	the motion to dismiss nor did they seek any such	10	to amend but waited until after the Court ruled on
1			
11	leave even in the alternative in response to the	11	the motion and dismissed the case before it filed the
11 12		11 12	the motion and dismissed the case before it filed the motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh
	leave even in the alternative in response to the		
12	leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss.	12	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh
12 13	leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss. They at no point filed a motion for	12 13	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh against allowing the plaintiff leave to amend their
12 13 14	leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss. They at no point filed a motion for leave to amend until after the hearing on the motion	12 13 14	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh against allowing the plaintiff leave to amend their complaint to add new facts and new claims at this
12 13 14 15	leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss. They at no point filed a motion for leave to amend until after the hearing on the motion to dismiss after the Court took that motion under	12 13 14 15	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh against allowing the plaintiff leave to amend their complaint to add new facts and new claims at this point.
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss.     They at no point filed a motion for leave to amend until after the hearing on the motion to dismiss after the Court took that motion under advisement and then after the Court entered its order dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. So this factor weighs against leave to amend.     The fourth factor of promptness also</pre>	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh against allowing the plaintiff leave to amend their complaint to add new facts and new claims at this point. Plaintiff cites no case that allows a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint after the Court had dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction regardless of whether that dismissal was with or without prejudice.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss.     They at no point filed a motion for leave to amend until after the hearing on the motion to dismiss after the Court took that motion under advisement and then after the Court entered its order dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. So this factor weighs against leave to amend.     The fourth factor of promptness also favors the denial of leave to amend in this case. If</pre>	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh against allowing the plaintiff leave to amend their complaint to add new facts and new claims at this point. Plaintiff cites no case that allows a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint after the Court had dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction regardless of whether that dismissal was with or without prejudice. Instead plaintiff relies on cases where
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>leave even in the alternative in response to the motion to dismiss.             They at no point filed a motion for leave to amend until after the hearing on the motion to dismiss after the Court took that motion under advisement and then after the Court entered its order dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. So this factor weighs against leave to amend.             The fourth factor of promptness also favors the denial of leave to amend in this case. If such a motion is presented as soon as possible at the</pre>	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	motion. So the balance of the Loyola factors weigh against allowing the plaintiff leave to amend their complaint to add new facts and new claims at this point. Plaintiff cites no case that allows a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint after the Court had dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction regardless of whether that dismissal was with or without prejudice. Instead plaintiff relies on cases where the complaint contained a pleading deficiency which

	september		·
	Page 50		Page 51
1	in this case.	1	of the plaintiff and to add the correct citation
2	For example, in Muirfield-Village of	2	to the Municipal Code on which the complaint was
3	Vernon Hills versus Reinke (349 Ill. App. 3d 178),	3	based.
4	a Second District case from 2004, the defendant filed	4	On appeal, the defendant argued that
5	a Section 2-615 motion to dismiss which challenged	5	the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff leave
6	the legal sufficiency of the complaint and argued	6	to amend. The Appellate Court held that the policy
7	that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts	7	in Illinois is to remove barriers which prevent the
8	to state a cause of action.	8	resolution of a case on its merits; and to that end,
9	The present case, however, involves a	9	permission to amend pleadings should be liberally
10	2-619 motion to dismiss for lack of personal	10	and freely given so that the cases are decided
11	jurisdiction and is not the same situation. The	11	on their merits instead of on procedural
12	Court in Muirfield held that quote, "When a cause	12	technicalities.
13	of action can be stated, a trial court abuses its	13	However, in the present case, the lack
14	discretion if it refuses to allow the plaintiff to	14	of personal jurisdiction is not a procedural
15	amend its complaint, " end quote.	15	technicality nor is it a barrier preventing
16	Yet here the issue presented in	16	resolution of a case on the merits. It's a matter
17	Westforth's motion to dismiss was not whether the	17	of due process which is not a procedural
18	plaintiff could state a cause of action but	18	technicality.
19	whether this Court had personal jurisdiction over	19	Plaintiff also cites Jeffrey M.
20	Westforth.	20	Goldberg & Associates versus Collins Tuttle & Company
21	Another case cited by the plaintiff is	21	(264 Ill. App. 3d 878), a First District case from
22	County of Peoria versus Couture (2022 Ill. App. 3d	22	1974, for the proposition that there is a strong
23	210091). In that case, the trial court allowed the	23	policy which favors an adequate hearing of a
24	plaintiff to amend the complaint to correct the name	24	litigant's claim on the merits. However, that's not
1	Page 52	1	Page 53
1	an issue in our case.	1	So the concerns raised by the courts
2	an issue in our case. It's undisputed that the dismissal for	2	So the concerns raised by the courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff about procedural
2	an issue in our case. It's undisputed that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a decision on	2 3	So the concerns raised by the courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff about procedural technicalities or making sure the litigant's claims
2 3 4	an issue in our case. It's undisputed that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits nor does it have a res adjudicata effect	2 3 4	So the concerns raised by the courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff about procedural technicalities or making sure the litigant's claims can be heard on the merits are not at issue here
2 3 4 5	an issue in our case. It's undisputed that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits nor does it have a res adjudicata effect to preclude the plaintiff from bringing the same	2 3 4 5	So the concerns raised by the courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff about procedural technicalities or making sure the litigant's claims can be heard on the merits are not at issue here where this Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
2 3 4 5 6	an issue in our case. It's undisputed that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits nor does it have a res adjudicata effect to preclude the plaintiff from bringing the same claims against the same defendant in the proper	2 3 4 5 6	So the concerns raised by the courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff about procedural technicalities or making sure the litigant's claims can be heard on the merits are not at issue here where this Court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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1	get to the airport.		STATE OF ILLINOIS )
2	MS. LEFKOWITZ: Thank you.	2	) SS:
3	MR. RUDD: Thank you, your Honor.	3	COUNTY OF DU PAGE )
4	(Which were all the proceedings	4	I, PATRICIA M. STONE, a Certified Shorthand
5	had in the above-entitled cause on	5	Reporter of the State of Illinois, do hereby certify
6	this date.)	6	that I reported in shorthand the proceedings had at
7		7	the hearing aforesaid, and that the foregoing is a
8		8	true, complete, and correct transcript of the
9		9	proceedings of said hearing as appears from my
10		10	stenographic notes so taken and transcribed under my
11		11	personal direction.
12		12	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I do hereunto set my hand at
13		13	Chicago, Illinois, this 4th day of October, 2023.
14		14	
15		15	
16		16	
17		17	fame MbStone
18		18	Patricia M. Stone, CSR
19		19	CSR Certificate No. 084-002880
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