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EXHIBIT D

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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                            NORTHERN DIVISION
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 4
    NATIONAL SHOOTING SPORTS
    FOUNDATION, INC.,
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         Plaintiff,
                                    Civil No.
 6
                                    )1:25-cv-01115-RSB
         VS.
 7
    ANTHONY BROWN, et al.,
                                    )Baltimore, Maryland
 8
                                    )August 26, 2025
         Defendants.
                                    )10:00 a.m.
 9
10
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         TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
12
                 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. BALLOU
13
14
    APPEARANCES
15
    On Behalf of the Plaintiff:
         Matthew D. Rowen, Esquire
         James W. Porter, III, Esquire
16
         John P. Sweeney, Esquire
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         Nicholas A. Aquart, Esquire
    On Behalf of the Defendants:
18
         Joshua R. Chazen, Esquire
19
20
21
22
           (Computer-aided transcription of stenotype notes)
23
                Reported by:
                              Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR
                       Federal Official Reporter
24
                    101 W. Lombard Street, 4th Floor
25
                       Baltimore, Maryland 21201
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    (10:00 \text{ a.m.})
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             THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning,
 3
    everybody. Let's call our case, if we can, please.
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             THE CLERK: Yes. Your Honor, calling the case of
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    National Shooting Sports Foundation Incorporated v. Brown, Case
    Number RSB-25-cv-1115. The case is called for a hearing on a
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    Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
         If the plaintiff counsel could put their appearance on the
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 9
    record, please.
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             MR. ROWEN:
                         Matthew Rowen for plaintiff.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Rowen, nice to meet you.
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             MR. PORTER: I'm James Porter, also for the plaintiff.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Porter, nice to meet you.
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             MR. SWEENEY:
                           John Sweeney for the plaintiff as well,
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    Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Mr. Sweeney.
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             MR. AQUART:
                          Nicholas Aquart for the plaintiffs as
    well, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Nice to meet you.
             MR. CHAZEN: And Joshua Chazen on behalf of the
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    defendant.
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             THE COURT: You're outnumbered.
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             MR. CHAZEN: Outnumbered today. So we'll see if that
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    intellectual brain trust can meet my learned colleagues on the
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    other side.
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             THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you all very much.
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   Let the record reflect that the parties today are present by
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   way of their counsel.
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         Let me just start, there may have been a little bit of
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    confusion yesterday. We failed to put a notice of hearing on
    the record. And thank you all for listening to me during our
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    conference call for the date of the hearing but we're all here.
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   We're ready to go in connection with this. I appreciate
   y'all's briefs. I read those. I read the amicus as well.
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                                                                So
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    I'm ready to hear argument.
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         I believe, I guess, Mr. Rowen, are you going to take the
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    lead for us today?
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             MR. ROWEN: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Go right ahead, please.
                        May I use the --
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             MR. ROWEN:
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             THE COURT: Wherever you are most comfortable is fine
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            It's not often you have to walk back to the podium when
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    you go into the courtroom, right?
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             MR. ROWEN:
                         Exactly.
         Before I begin, I conferred with Mr. Chazen, and both
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21
    parties wanted to thank Your Honor for coming up from Roanoke.
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    We know it's a schlep, and it's a little bit of unusual
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    circumstances. So on behalf of both parties, we wanted to
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    thank you and your whole staff for coming in.
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             THE COURT: Well, I enjoyed the drive up. My law
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clerk and I came up last night. We stayed down on the waterfront and it was a beautiful night and very pleasant evening and good food. So it was a good excuse to come up and enjoy the Inner Harbor. Thank you.

MR. ROWEN: Glad to hear it.

With that out of the way, again, Matthew Rowen on behalf of the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. ROWEN: Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act to stamp out efforts by state and local governments to use negligence and nuisance theories to impose sweeping liability on members of the firearms industry and make them pay to redress harms caused by third-party criminals who misuse their lawful products.

For almost 20 years, the immunity that Congress conferred held. But in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in *Bruen*, in which the court made clear once and for all that the Second Amendment is not second class, a small handful of states, the same handful of states that had defied *Heller* for a decade, decided to try defying Congress's judgment, too.

Maryland House Bill 947 is the latest in this recent spate of laws. So it should come as no surprise that Maryland House Bill 947 conflicts with federal law and is preempted to the extent it authorizes liability --

THE COURT: So as you raise the other states -- and

I'm going to stumble over the names, I'm going to use the acronym -- NSSF has brought a number of suits, on my count I think it was about seven or eight, and only one of them has gotten to the merits to the extent that it is the merits on summary judgment. Those have been dismissed on, I believe, on standing grounds, and there's one abstention. And then the Second Circuit recently affirmed -- was it Northern District of New York, if I remember correctly.

So, thus far, you haven't convinced a court that any of these laws are -- conflict with the congressional statute, right?

MR. ROWEN: So we've convinced two district court judges that there's a conflict. So let me take a step back.

So you're right, there are, I think, seven other states have these laws. And the first handful of litigations that were brought were all brought in a preenforcement posture.

THE COURT: Right. Create a standing problem.

MR. ROWEN: Right. All but the New York case were -- all of those were dismissed on standing grounds.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROWEN: So the exceptions were California and New Jersey. In the first go around in New Jersey, Judge Quereshi there ruled that the statute is preempted by the PLCAA. That eventually was reversed on standing grounds given that it was in a preenforcement posture. And there, the Attorney General's

counsel for New Jersey represented it had no intention of suing
NSSF members for conduct that was not otherwise unlawful. That
intention proved not to be entirely accurate, but we're
litigating that now in New Jersey. And we'll be appealing the
New Jersey District Court's recent decision on abstention
grounds.

And in California, the district court judge there in *NSSF v. Bonta* held that a related provision, that we did have standing with respect to that, and that that violates the Dormant Commerce Clause by directly regulating out-of-state conduct, the same way that we alleged the HB947 does here.

And I think there are two things to take a way from that:

One is we're not in a preenforcement context here. We know the Attorney General -- at least what the Attorney General thinks the statute covers because it brought an action. It brought an action against an NSSF member. The Attorney General uses that to say, well, that some trigger Younger abstention in the same way that Judge Quereshi recently held in the District of New Jersey.

And, on that point, while we respectfully disagree with Judge Quereshi's opinion and are appealing it, I actually don't think it maps here at all.

So the fundamental prerequisite for the *Younger* abstention, and the Fourth Circuit has made this clear, is a request to enjoin state court proceedings.

And I want to be as explicit as I possibly can. We're not asking Your Honor to enjoin anything.

THE COURT: But the relief that you seek, you are asking to enjoin. I mean, and that is a declaration that says this statute can't be applied to any NSSF member, including Glock, right?

MR. ROWEN: To the extent that's how Your Honor reads our request for relief --

THE COURT: Is that what you're asking for?

MR. ROWEN: So I don't think so. Precisely because what we're seeking is forward-looking relief. And to the extent that Your Honor reads our request for relief that way, I'm happy to say we are -- we accept that the Glock suit is going to rise and fall on its own terms. To the extent Your Honor thinks it prevail --

THE COURT: But it can't be -- it can't be that -- I can declare a statute unconstitutional or preempted from today forward and say that before then it was not, right? As a practical matter --

MR. ROWEN: Well, with respect you can, Your Honor.

And the Fourth Circuit made this clear in the *Jonathan R.* case, which is 41 F.4th 316, where the court made clear that -- so they said -- I'll get you the exact quote.

They said, "It's true that a district court might find violation where a state court might not but that's not enough

to trigger *Younger*." That's Pages 333 and 334. That ordinary res judicata principles are not enough to trigger *Younger*.

The court made clear that what is the fundamental prerequisite to trigger *Younger* abstention is the request to enjoin or interfere with state court proceedings.

And we are not asking you to enjoin the Glock suit.

We accept that there is no relief here that we can get today that will preclude that suit from going forward.

Now, sure, that court may, you know, if Your Honor agrees with us across the board, that court may find Your Honor's opinion very persuasive in the same way that the Third Circuit might find the Fourth Circuit opinions very persuasive. But there would be neither preclusive effect -- and, again, we are not asking for any interference with the Glock suit.

The Fourth Circuit has made crystal clear that the only type of relief that triggers *Younger* is a request to interfere with state court proceedings.

THE COURT: But your request for relief, number two, is a preliminary injunction asking the attorney -- to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing, from enforcing. And to go forward with that lawsuit would be enforcing that statute, would it not?

MR. ROWEN: So we intended that to be forward-looking.

To the extent Your Honor isn't reading it that way, I'm happy

to cut against ourselves here and say we are only asking for

future enforcements, not with respect to the Glock suit. That suit's gonna rise and fall on its own terms in state court.

THE COURT: So how does that court deal with -- and this is where -- I don't want to say it doesn't make a lot of sense, but I'm having a hard time putting the pieces together to where let's say I agree with you, and I find that there's either preemption or it violates the commerce clause, whatever it may be, and that court disagrees, right? Then you've got one of your members who doesn't get the benefit of the ruling from this court and is being held liable from the enforcement of a statute that this court says can't be enforced against it, right?

In other words, Maryland wouldn't be able to bring another lawsuit against Glock for something similar or different or whatever it may be. How does that work?

MR. ROWEN: So I think that outcome respects federalism because and the way it would work it would be sort of in a normal course where if two different parties in two different courts challenged the same statute --

THE COURT: But there's also federalism that's respected by allowing the Maryland court to make a decision on these exact same issues about its own statute. And then if -- whoever disagrees, whatever the outcome is, let that work its way up to the Maryland Supreme Court and beyond, if necessary.

MR. ROWEN: So in the Fourth Circuit, in Jonathan R.,